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5Executive summary 
The dramatic effects of climate change are being 
felt across the European continent and the world. 
Considering how sluggish and unsuccessful the world 
has been in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
the impacts will become long-lasting scars. Even 
implementing radical climate mitigation now would be 
insufficient in addressing the economic, societal and 
environmental implications of climate change, which 
are expected to only intensify in the years to come.
This means climate mitigation must go hand in 
hand with the adaptation efforts recognised in the 
Paris Agreement. And although the damages of 
climate change are usually localised and adaptation 
measures often depend on local specificities, given 
the interconnections between ecosystems, people 
and economies in a globalised world there are strong 
reasons for European Union (EU) member states to join 
forces, pool risk and cooperate across borders. Sharing 
information, good practices, experiences and resources 
to strengthen resilience and enhance adaptive capacity 
makes sense economically, environmentally and socially.
The European Commission’s 2013 Adaptation Strategy is 
the first attempt to set EU-wide adaptation and climate 
resilience and could be considered novel in that it tried 
to mainstream adaptation goals into relevant legislation, 
instruments and funds. It was not very proactive, 
however. It also lacked long-term perspective, failed to 
put the adaptation file high on the political agenda, was 
under resourced, and suffered from knowledge gaps and 
silo thinking.
The Commission’s European Green Deal proposal, which 
has been presented as a major step forward to the goal 
of Europe becoming the world’s first climate-neutral 
continent, suggests that the Commission will adopt a 
new EU strategy on adaptation to climate within the 
first two years of its mandate (2020-2021). In light of the 
risks climate change poses to ecosystems, societies and 
the economy (through inter alia the vulnerability of the 
supply chain to climate change and its potential failure 
to provide services to consumers), adaptation should 
take a prominent role alongside mitigation in the EU’s 
political climate agenda.
Respecting the division of treaty competences, there 
are important areas where EU-wide action and support 
could foster the continent’s resilience to climate change. 
The European Policy Centre (EPC) project “Building a 
climate-resilient Europe”, which has culminated in this 
Issue Paper, has identified the following: (i) the ability to 
convert science-based knowledge into preventive action 
and responsible behaviour, thus filling the information 
gap; (ii) the need to close the protection gap through 
better risk management and risk sharing; (iii) the 
necessity to adopt nature-based infrastructural solutions 
widely and tackle the grey infrastructure bias; and (iv) the 
need to address the funding and investment gap.
This Issue Paper aims to help inform the upcoming 
EU Adaptation Strategy and, by extension, strengthen 
the EU’s resilience to climate change. To that end, the 
authors make a call for the EU to mainstream adaptation 
and shift its focus from reacting to disasters to a more 
proactive approach that prioritises prevention, risk 
reduction and resilience building. In doing so, the EU 
must ensure fairness and distributive justice while 
striving for climate change mitigation and protecting 
the environment and biodiversity.
To succeed, the new EU Adaptation Strategy will need to 
address specific challenges related to the information, 
protection, funding and investment gaps; and the 
grey infrastructure bias. To tackle and address those 
challenges, this Paper proposes 17 solutions outlined in 
Table 1 (see page 6). 
6Table 1: Recommendations for a renewed EU adaptation strategy 
Gaps in the current strategy Recommendations
The information gap
1.    Value information on losses as a public good.
2.    Empower the European Environment Agency and EIOPA to provide more 
comprehensive monitoring and mapping of risks.
3.    Put in place a single, unified and accessible data collection and a transparent 
reporting mechanism for risk and disaster damages and losses.
4.    Strengthen building codes with mandatory standards and support the use of 
insurers’ data in zoning and construction standards.
5.    Bolster the efforts to develop EU metrics to evaluate the impacts of adaptation efforts.
6.    Foster structured discussion forums on bottom-up and co-designed adaptation options.
The protection gap
7.    Make use of NASs and NAPs to increase awareness of climate risk management 
among stakeholders.
8.    Guide the introduction of smart subsidies, tax deductions or insurance vouchers to 
the poor and vulnerable.
9.    Encourage member states to include investment opportunities to reduce climate 
change-related risks in their budgets and planning.
10.  Create an EU-wide weather and climate risk insurance pool or voluntary regional 
risk pool.
The grey infrastructure bias
11.  Evaluate infrastructure investments based on their climate resilience, mitigation 
potential and embedded carbon.
12.   Explore a BBB requirement that does justice to the undervalued benefits of green 
infrastructure.
13.   Consider green infrastructure’s co-benefits when assessing adaptation options.
The funding and investment gap
14.   Integrate DRR and climate resilience efforts into insurance, investment risk 
models, capital requirements and rating agencies, all under the umbrella of the 
action plan on sustainable finance.
15.   Agree on and apply consistently a climate risk proofing methodology across every 
MFF budget chapter.
16.   Establish clear tracking methodologies and effective ex ante conditionalities for 
climate-related EU spending.
17.   Link the disbursement of EU budget to the adoption and implementation of NASs 
and NAPs.
7Introduction
Too little, too slow. The EU was slow to act on the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development’s efforts to put environmental needs 
of present and future generations at the heart of 
developmental policies, and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on 
the reduction of GHG emission targets and it dragged its 
feet until 1999 before finally adopting its first projects 
on climate change mitigation (i.e. the LIFE programme). 
Its adaptation policy is now suffering from a similar 
fate. Adopting the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) 2014 definitions, climate change 
mitigation aims to reduce or eliminate the drivers of 
climate change by reducing anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, whereas climate change adaptation 
attempts to limit or manage climate change impacts,  
both real and expected.1
Adaptation has historically been 
considered a national issue. As such, 
member states have been reluctant to 
attribute additional competences to 
address the issue to the EU.
EU adaptation to climate change has long been relegated 
to the passenger seat for several reasons: 
1. There was a longstanding concern that embracing 
adaptation as a policy option would affect efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions negatively, which was one of 
the first priorities of European climate policy.
2. Adaptation has historically been considered a national 
issue. As such, member states have been reluctant to 
attribute additional competences to the EU to address 
the issue.
3. The perception of adaptation being an (almost 
exclusive) issue of low- and middle-income countries 
with low levels of investment has added spanners  
in the efforts to strengthen climate resilience  
in wealthier countries, namely EU members.2  
However, recent catastrophes such as the 2019-2020 
Australian bushfire season might mark a turning  
point in high-income countries’ embracing of 
adaptation measures. 
4. A strong belief in future innovation and technological 
development as the means of fighting climate change 
impacts seems to have hindered policymaking related 
to adaptation. 
5. Adaptation efforts that were taken tended to be weak, 
insufficient and centred on costly and ambiguous 
infrastructure projects rather than systems-based, 
multifunctional, science-grounded ones due to a 
lack of knowledge and/or incentive systems (e.g. 
availability of funding).  Most member states have 
been more than slow to adopt proactive measures.3 
6. The changing nature of risk and the fact that the past 
is no longer a reliable indicator of the future, requiring 
the EU to use more forward-looking scenarios and 
embrace their inherent uncertainty, is yet to be fully 
grasped.4 This also calls for the implementation of 
more robust, no-regret or low-regret solutions, which 
can support further the shift to nature-based solutions.
The early 2000s marked a turning point in the 
adaptation discourse. Think of the IPCC’s 2001 Third 
Assessment Report publication which emphasised that 
adaptation is an imperative for all countries, irrespective 
of their economic development;5 or the widely 
disseminated 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change which highlighted that the benefits of 
both mitigation and adaptation action outweigh the 
economic costs of climate inaction.6 The 2015 Paris 
Agreement embraced this view further.
The need for effective and urgent climate action is 
paramount. Concretely, reducing GHG emissions and 
limiting global temperature increase to 1.5°C (instead of 
2°C) above preindustrial levels would generate significant 
savings and non-monetary benefits and would therefore 
lower adaptation needs considerably.7
The effects of climate change on Europe are unequivocal 
and the cost of foreseen damages significant. Science 
has unflinchingly put it down in black and white: Europe 
does not have the luxury to only focus on mitigation 
efforts. Even in the unlikely case where a 1.5°C increase 
limit is attained, mitigation will not be enough. Given the 
fact that some effects of climate change are irreversible, 
adaptation will be essential to build resilience and ought 
to be mainstreamed across all policy developments, 
strategies and scenarios that strive towards climate 
neutrality and a just transition. 
Science has unflinchingly put it down  
in black and white: Europe does not  
have the luxury to only focus on  
mitigation efforts.
A decade after the launch of the EPC-King Baudouin 
Foundation joint Task Force on Climate Change 
Adaptation in Europe that culminated in the 2012 
publication “The climate is changing – is Europe ready? 
Building a common approach to adaptation”,8 which 
helped shape the EU’s 2013 Adaptation Strategy,9 the EPC 
studies how it has fared. To do so, this Issue Paper builds 
on the 2019 EPC project “Building a climate-resilient 
8Europe”, which showed consensus between a variety of 
stakeholders regarding the most pressing gaps in the EU 
framework for climate adaptation and the lessons learnt 
from the midterm 2018 review,10 and explored possible 
ways forward. Capitalising on the window of opportunity 
declared in the European Commission’s Green Deal to 
renew the Adaptation Strategy in the first two years of 
its mandate, the Paper advocates for a new strategy that 
strives to close the information, protection, funding and 
investment gaps as well as address grey infrastructure bias.
The discussion is organised as follows. Chapter 1 
examines the effects of climate change on Europe. 
Chapter 2 presents the state of play of EU action on 
climate adaptation.11 Chapter 3 identifies the main 
challenges, areas for European added value (EAV) and 
gaps in the current framework. The concluding section 
outlines the authors’ recommendations for a new EU 
adaptation strategy. 
Although an in-depth discussion on the external 
dimension of the EU’s Adaptation Strategy is beyond 
the scope of this Issue Paper, it should be noted that the 
success of the strategy will depend on its comprehensive 
approach and the adaptation-proofed use of foreign 
policy tools (e.g. humanitarian aid).
Chapter 1: The effects of climate change on Europe
The effects of climate change on socio-ecological systems 
are increasingly being felt across Europe, be they the 
intensification of extreme weather events; pluvial, 
coastal and river flooding; droughts; wildfires; heatwaves 
and desertification; rising sea levels; or a reduction 
in pollination. Even if global efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions prove to be successful, adverse impacts  
of climate change will be experienced in the future.12
However, while we cannot escape the impacts of climate 
change anymore, we do have the power to influence the 
magnitude of the events.13 Just like the other continents, 
Europe is experiencing a series of disruptive blows 
that are expected to lead to fundamental changes and 
affect natural and human systems gravely.14 Global 
environmental breakdown15 and climate emergency16  
– general terms that convey the reality of the issue 
crudely – have spread rapidly. The severity and 
unavoidability of the situation make the embracing  
of adaptation efforts extremely crucial.
Anthropogenic climate change will lead  
to profound environmental, geopolitical 
and socioeconomic ramifications across 
Europe unless robust adaptation measures 
are embraced.
The importance of both climate change adaptation and 
climate-related disaster risk reduction (DRR) have been 
recognised at both the EU and international levels. Bold 
initiatives like the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction and 2015 Paris Agreement heralded a 
fresh impetus on a global scale. The EU picked up the 
baton by supporting the Mayors Adapt initiative, a 
voluntary commitment within the Covenant of Mayors; 
and by adopting the 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy  
that led to some encouraging results, as demonstrated  
in its 2018 evaluation.
However, in light of the scale of the challenge and growing 
threats, efforts to enhance the coherence between climate 
change adaptation and DRR need to be stepped up. 
Moreover, considering the Union’s commitment to the 
Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals, 
renewing the EU’s Adaptation Strategy should be a priority 
for the new European Commission.
1.1.   THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND SECURITY 
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE  
IN EUROPE
Anthropogenic climate change will lead to profound 
environmental, geopolitical and socioeconomic 
ramifications across Europe unless robust adaptation 
measures are embraced, as the means of averting and 
learning to cope with the most devastating impacts. 
Climate change will have implications on people’s 
health by increasing the number of deaths from heat 
stress, malnutrition and diseases like malaria.17 It is 
already contributing to biodiversity loss and changes 
in ecosystems, thus affecting the availability of water 
and other resources. The effects are also felt across the 
economic sectors, from agriculture to tourism. Extreme 
events damage critical infrastructure needed for the 
provision of energy, water, health services and such. 
Moreover, disruptions in international supply chains, 
forced migration to the EU, and political instability and 
security challenges are an expected consequence of 
climate change. 
These outcomes will not be felt uniformly; instead, 
regions across Europe will be impacted in varying 
degrees, dealing a blow to economic activities and asset 
values and affecting all European citizens. It should also 
be noted that the social costs wrought by these unfolding 
climate-related events will have varying impacts 
depending on gender, class, ethnicity, age and (dis)ability. 
As stated in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, “People 
who are socially, economically, culturally, politically, 
institutionally, or otherwise marginalized are especially 
vulnerable to climate change and also to some adaptation 
and mitigation responses […].”18
The economic losses caused by extreme weather events 
in the European Economic Area (EEA) between 1980 and 
2017 amounted to approximately €453 billion (in 2017 
values; almost triple the 2017 EU budget, see Figure 
1, page 10). Furthermore, research indicates that the 
frequency, magnitude and duration or a combination of 
all three, and the consequent cost of these climate and 
weather events will continue to increase unless drastic 
actions are taken.
These outcomes will not be felt uniformly; 
instead, regions across Europe will be 
impacted in varying degrees, dealing a 
blow to economic activities and asset 
values and affecting all European citizens.
While the estimations for current and future climate-
induced damages to vital infrastructure (see Figure 2, 
page 10) and major investments in the energy, industrial 
and social sector differ, the scale of the impact of 
climate change is already visible. A study produced by 
the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
in 2016 suggests that the current annual cost of multi-
hazard and -sector impacts of critical infrastructures 
in the EEA33 reached €3.4 billion in 2010 values, and 
is expected to multiply six-fold by mid-century in the 
business-as-usual scenario. The same study estimates 
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 Fig. 1
that the strongest increase in multi-hazard damages is 
projected for the energy sector (i.e. over €4.4 billion per 
year, in 2010 values by the 2050s). 
These stark figures continue to rise in the business-as-usual 
trajectory, with some estimates signalling that the cost of 
damages to critical infrastructures and the aforementioned 
key investments may triple by the mid-2020s and multiply 
by a factor of 10 by the close of the century.21
Central and Southern Europe will experience droughts  
of increased frequency, duration and severity (see  
Figure 3). Eastern and Northern Europe will likely suffer 
from more frequent heavy rains and winter flooding.  
A recent assessment by the European Environment 
Agency shows that in both low emission (i.e. keeping 
global temperature increase well below 2°C, in line with 
the Paris Agreement) and high emission scenarios, there 
is an increased danger of fire in most European regions. 
Forest fires are expected to continue occurring, including 
in the regions of Northern and Western Europe, which 
traditionally are more immune to them (see Figure 4). 
Droughts and wildfires will be rife and worsen air quality, 
diminish the availability of water resources and cut back 
crop productivity.22
If no efforts to adapt to the peril of wildfire 
are made, some estimates point to a 
worrying 200% total increase of burned 
areas in Europe by 2090.
If no efforts to adapt to the peril of wildfire are made, 
some estimates point to a worrying 200% total increase  
of burned areas in Europe by 2090 compared to the  
2000-08 rate. The Balkan and Eastern European countries 
are predicted to suffer the highest increase of between 
150% and 560%, the Mediterranean region a rise between 
150% and 220%, and Central European and Baltic 
countries between 120% and 340% (see Figure 4).23
Other impacts – like the permanent inundation of  
low-lying coastal areas, coastal erosion, the degradation 
of coastal ecosystems, and salinity intrusion in deltas and 
estuaries – are expected to affect a vast swathe of the EU 
population (see Figure 5, Table 2, page 12). Approximately 
a third of EU citizens live within a 50km radius of coastal 
 Fig. 2 
Source: European Environment Agency (2019a)19
Source: European Commission (2018a)20
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locations, which are regions that contribute over 30% of 
the Union’s total GDP. Assets located in these areas are 
estimated to hold an economic value of between €500 
billion to €1 trillion. The magnitude of climate change 
impacts in the coastal areas vary between regions, however, 
based to some extent to their flood protection measures.26
Extreme weather and climate events are 
expected to transform crop production 
patterns across the continent drastically.
The impact of climate change could also completely 
upend Europe’s agricultural sector. Extreme weather 
and climate events are expected to alter current trade 
structures and agriculture income circulation within 
the EU significantly, thus transforming crop production 
patterns across the continent drastically.27 The current 
agricultural heartlands in Southern Europe (i.e. Spain, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal) are foreseen to experience 
losses of farmland value of -5% to -9% per every degree 
Celsius increased (see Figure 6, page 13) while regions 
in Northern and Western Europe will have elongated 
growing seasons and improved climatic conditions for 
agricultural practices. If the Mediterranean region is 
to adapt its agricultural practices and improve flood 
protection, it must improve its water usage considerably, 
abandon monoculture and adopt new types of crops.28 
 Fig. 4 
 Fig. 3 
PROJECTED CHANGES IN THE FREQUENCY OF METEOROLOGICAL DROUGHTS
FOR TWO EMISSIONS SCENARIOS, FOR THE PERIOD 2041-2070 COMPARED TO 1981-2010
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Source: European Environment Agency (2020)24
Source: European Environment Agency (2020)25
According to a recent assessment by the European 
Environment Agency, adaptation measures could 
significantly reduce the negative economic impacts of 
climate change in the agricultural sector (see Figure 7).
Climate change could act as a threat 
multiplier in the Mediterranean 
neighbourhood, and translate into an 
increase in climate refugees heading for 
the EU, as witnessed during the onset of 
the Syrian Civil War. 
 
Furthermore, higher temperatures are expected to 
translate into an increase in deaths caused by heat 
stress and a decrease in the daily average outdoor 
labour productivity (which is especially relevant in the 
agricultural and construction sectors) by 17% in Southern 
Europe and up to 4% in Northern Europe.31
Lastly, climate change could act as a threat multiplier 
in the Mediterranean neighbourhood – one of the most 
at-risk regions due to climate change – and translate  
into an increase in climate refugees heading to the  
EU, as witnessed during the onset of the Syrian Civil 
War.32 As argued in the 2018 Global Compact on  
Refugees, “climate, environmental degradation and 
natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers  
of refugee movements.”33
In a 2017 resolution, the European Parliament called on 
the EU and its member states to implement the UN’s Paris 
Agreement and take the lead in recognising the influence 
of climate change on mass displacement. The Parliament 
also advocated for a special international protection status 
for the displaced.  In addition, in his 2015 State of the 
Union speech, former European Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker unequivocally stated that “[c]limate 
change is […] one [of] the root causes of a new migration 
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 Fig. 5 
Table 2: EU27 simulations for scenarios A2 and B1 
People flooded 
[thousand/year]
Land loss  
[km²/year]
Damage cost 
[million €/year]
Adaptation cost 
[million €/year]
Total cost 
[million €/year]
2010 15.0              14.8 3.4              3.4 3,136         3,329 0              0 3,136         3,329
2030 21.3              20.1  6.7              5.6 4,767         5,662 0              0 4,767         5,662
2050 35.0              28.9  9.9              7.8 6,450         8,192 0              0 6,450         8,192
2100 776.2            204.5 16.4             12.2 16,933      17,496 0              0 16,933      17,496
Source: European Environment Agency (2011)29
Source: Hinkel et al. (2010)30
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phenomenon” and that “[c]limate refugees will become 
a new challenge – if we do not act swiftly.”34 The EU will 
thus need to mobilise its foreign policy toolbox to address 
climate-induced challenges outside of its borders more 
proactively, while simultaneously investing more resources 
in its own adaptation policy.
1.2.   THE RATIONALE FOR ACTION AT THE  
EU LEVEL
Adapting to climate change is, therefore, a social, 
environmental and economic imperative. While the 
damages are usually inflicted within a localised setting, 
their effects are felt across member states, pointing to a 
strong rationale for EU-level coordination and cooperation 
in building climate resilience. For example, unexpected 
changes in the supply of a product or commodity (i.e. supply 
chain shocks) by an external partner can create threats to 
the entire Union. In light of the interconnectedness of world 
markets, the EU also has a big role in pushing for more 
ambitious international efforts in the field of adaptation, as 
argued by the European Parliament.36
Unexpected changes in the supply of a 
product or commodity by an external 
partner can create threats to the entire 
Union. The EU has a big role in pushing for 
more ambitious international efforts in the 
field of adaptation.
 
Another reason for strengthening adaptation efforts at 
the EU level concerns the importance of EU funds for 
member states. A renewed climate adaptation strategy 
could incentivise resilience building and strengthen risk 
understanding by member states if said funds are climate-
proofed and a sound and equitable financial management 
is ensured so that all countries have the same climate risk 
management rules. 
While there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach to 
adaptation, the EU has accumulated a level of knowledge 
and expertise that no member state can procure alone 
and which can be utilised for local circumstances. 
Moreover, several studies have concluded that adaptation 
measures to serious challenges like forest fires and sea 
level rise would be both beneficial and affordable, but 
these would be best addressed by pooling resources and 
applying similar approaches throughout the Union.37 In 
other words, risk pooling and cross-border cooperation 
make economic, environmental and social sense. 
PROJECTED CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL LAND VALUE IN EU15
FOR 2071-2100 VS 1961-1990, IN CASE OF NO ADAPTATION
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 Fig. 7 
ESTIMATED INCOME CHANGE FOR FARMERS WITH AND WITHOUT ADAPTATION (%)
No adaptation Best adaptation
> -5 0.5 to 5 -0.5 to 0.5 -10 to -0.5 ≤ -10
Source: Van Passel et al. (2017)35
Source: European Environment Agency (2020)38
The rationale for action at the EU level also resides in 
the power – albeit symbolic for the time being – of the 
country-specific recommendations that the European 
Commission makes to member states as part of the 
European Semester. The Semester enables members 
to coordinate their economic policies and address the 
economic challenges facing the Union, as well as climate, 
energy and social issues. In 2019, the recommendations 
for three member states – Bulgaria, Czechia and  
Germany – explicitly mentioned the need to step up 
climate adaptation action. Despite the Commission’s 
inability to enforce the European Semester 
recommendations, they remain a useful tool to highlight 
major deficiencies in member states’ adaptation efforts 
that could potentially lead to serious economic costs if 
they are not addressed adequately.
Lastly, although the European Central Bank (ECB) 
does not have exclusive powers in the field of financial 
stability nor the competence to act on its own, it 
does play a contributory role in this area through its 
advisory functions. Since financial stability relies on 
risk management exercises, the pursuit of this objective 
should be cognisant of climate risks. Put differently, 
through the ECB, the EU can contribute to dealing with 
the risks climate change poses to financial stability.39
Despite the Commission’s inability 
to enforce the European Semester 
recommendations, they remain a useful 
tool to highlight major deficiencies in 
member states’ adaptation efforts  
that could potentially lead to serious 
economic costs.
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Chapter 2: The state of play of EU action on climate 
adaptation
 The EU’s Adaptation Strategy was launched in April 2013, 
four years after the publication of the White Paper on 
Climate Adaptation and after months of consultations 
with member states. The Strategy is the result of a 
transparent drafting process where member states were 
given the opportunity to provide their feedback from 
an early stage, to enhance Europe’s resilience to the 
ever-increasing challenges posed by climate change, by 
encouraging countries to act rapidly. More specifically, 
it is structured around three priority areas: (i) bolstering 
awareness-raising and encouraging action on the part of 
member states; (ii) coordinating adaptation information; 
and (iii) mobilising new forms of analysis and quantifying 
the resulting outcomes for those major sectors that are 
deemed to be most exposed to damaging impacts. A 
subset of related actions accompanies each priority area 
(see Table 3).
A major objective of the 2013 Adaptation 
Strategy consists of the EU becoming 
climate-resilient by mainstreaming 
adaptation goals into some of the relevant 
legislation and instruments.
This non-binding blueprint establishes the framework 
and mechanisms through which the EU can implement 
climate adaptive and resilient measures, while 
simultaneously paving the way for a holistic approach 
that covers the cumulative nature of effects on the 
environment, harmonised and transboundary measures. 
2.1.   MAINSTREAMING ADAPTATION GOALS 
INTO ALL RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND 
INSTRUMENTS
A major objective of the 2013 Adaptation Strategy 
consists of the EU becoming climate-resilient by 
mainstreaming adaptation goals into some of the 
relevant legislation and instruments. It was devised 
as a ‘framework strategy’ that simply establishes the 
overarching objectives of the Strategy without stipulating 
a strict set of criteria for its implementation, hence its 
mixed record.
From a legislative standpoint, EU directives such as 
the Flood Directive 2007/60/EC and Water Framework 
Directive 2000/60/EC already integrate adaptation 
considerations. Adaptation has also been assimilated 
into platforms, including the European Climate 
Adaptation Platform (Climate-ADAPT) and the EU’s 
Earth observation programme, Copernicus. Furthermore, 
adaptation goals are embedded in National Adaptation 
Strategies (NASs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) 
and integrated into relevant sectorial legislation. If done 
properly, mainstreaming adaptation across numerous 
policies (e.g. development cooperation) and programmes 
will ensure that the EU is set up better to address current 
and future climate shocks and stressors.40
Table 3: Overview of the 2013 EU Adaptation Strategy’s priorities areas and their associated actions 
Priority 1: Promoting action by member states
Action 1: Encouraging member states to adopt NASs and NAPs
Action 2: LIFE funding, including adaptation priority areas
Action 3: Promoting adaptation action by cities along the Covenant of Mayors
Priority 2: Better informed decision-making
Action 4: Knowledge-gap strategy
Action 5: Climate-ADAPT platform
Priority 3: Major vulnerable sectors
Action 6: Climate proofing the CAP, Cohesion Policy and Common Fisheries Policy
Action 7: Making infrastructure more resilient
Action 8: Promoting products and services by insurance and finance markets
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2.2.   ‘ADAPTING’ THE EU ECONOMY: DESIGN 
AND FUNDING ISSUES?
Besides policies, climate adaptation is also being 
mainstreamed into various EU financial instruments and 
funds, usually as part of a wider effort to mainstream 
climate actions. The current Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) contains a 20% climate mainstreaming 
target – a share that exceeds far beyond what most 
individual countries are committing to. That share is 
likely to increase following the European Commission’s 
suggestion to earmark 25% of the upcoming 2021-27 MFF 
to climate-related spending – a target that was broadly 
endorsed by the Council in March 2019.41 However, it 
remains to be seen whether the overall budget for climate 
action will grow.
The current MFF contains a 20% climate 
mainstreaming target, which is expected 
to increase following the Commission’s 
suggestion to earmark 25% of the 
upcoming 2021-27 MFF to  
climate-related spending.
 
The Commission is also spearheading efforts to climate 
proof and include tailor-made climate adaptation 
mainstreaming targets into the different programmes of 
the new budget (e.g. European Structural and Investment 
Funds or ESIF, Horizon Europe, Common Agricultural 
Policy or CAP, research programmes), as is the case  
with regional funding, InvestEU and the Connecting 
Europe Facility.
The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
is currently, on paper, the primary contributor to climate 
adaptation funding, followed by a combination of the 
European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund 
and European Territorial Cooperation (see Figure 8).
The longstanding LIFE programme is, however, the only 
funding programme dedicated specifically to supporting 
climate and environmental policy. In keeping with  
Action 2 of the Adaptation Strategy (see Table 3,  
page 15), its sub-programme for climate action provides 
funding for numerous adaptation practices that support 
capacity building and the stepping up of adaptation 
action, including the management of cross-border 
flooding events and coastal regions, mountainous areas 
and islands, territories susceptible to drought and 
desertification, and urban environments. LIFE is  
expected to be revamped in 2021 and divided into 
two sub-programmes: climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, implemented by the Directorate-General (DG) 
for Climate Action; and Clean Energy Transition, to be 
placed under the aegis of DG Energy.
Lastly, Horizon 2020 (H2020), the EU’s flagship research 
and innovation initiative, considers climate action to be a 
central pillar of the programme as well as a cross-cutting 
theme. In line with Action 4 of the Adaptation Strategy, 
funding has been allocated to projects that attempt 
to bridge the knowledge gap. Estimates indicate that 
climate-oriented expenditure could surpass 35% of the 
total H2020 budget by the end of the programme.42 Under 
Horizon Europe (2021-27), H2020’s successor, climate-
related challenges are expected to play a more prominent 
role. Five mission areas have been identified and are 
currently being developed; climate change and climate-
neutral cities being two of them. Horizon Europe could 
be a huge catalyser for positive change, for its very goals 
are to convert theory into practice, deliver testing and 
demonstrate solutions and that could be scaled up. 
A disclaimer put forward by the European Court of 
Auditors (ECA) should be mentioned, however: “the 
[climate financing] tracking method does not reflect 
 Fig. 8 
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the full financial effects of EU spending on climate 
action through financial instruments, nor does it 
distinguish between funding for mitigation and 
adaptation measures.”44 Put differently, unlike other 
international systems (that are based on the principle 
of conservativeness) which prefer to under-report 
rather than over-report (i.e. when climate finance data 
is unavailable or uncertain), the “EU’s tracking system 
provides no information on how much is spent on climate 
change mitigation and adaptation”.45
This design flaw makes it difficult to determine which 
amount spent to withstand climate change corresponds 
to pure adaptation spending and which to the usual brick 
and mortar. For instance, an ‘adapted’ energy distribution 
and transmission network do not only require higher 
temperature-proof transmitters and taller poles, but also 
a careful selection of location. 
Despite the absence of a solid tracking method, the 
importance of increasing the means to mainstream 
adaptation is generally not contested. Another disclaimer 
is worth mentioning, however: any increase in funds  
will be counterproductive if the money is not (well)  
spent on measures that mitigate climate change and 
ensure the target’s adaptive capacity and resilience to 
climate change.
2.3.   ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
The 2013 Strategy has provided a clear and productive 
framework for stimulating, facilitating and supporting 
adaptation activities throughout the EU. The three goals 
and eight related actions have helped set the basis for 
implementation. These actions translated into concrete 
products, such as guidelines on developing adaptation 
strategies, which in turn made it easier for member 
states to approve NASs (see Figure 9, page 18). 
Climate-ADAPT (i.e. Action 5 of the Adaptation 
Strategy) has led to particularly positive results 
concerning the spreading of adaptation knowledge 
across all governance levels. This initiative is seen as 
a one-stop-shop for adaptation information in Europe 
and is resourced by the European Commission and 
EEA. Its main activity has been to develop a website 
to enhance stakeholders’ understanding of the bloc’s 
vulnerability to climate change impacts and measures 
that improve resilience. The Copernicus programme, 
which administers climate change services, has been 
integrated into the platform.
Lastly, the Strategy has allowed for a higher degree 
of visibility for the need to have climate adaptation 
considerations integrated across EU-level policies 
and budgets, as demonstrated in the independent and 
thorough 2018 review ordered by the Commission.46
However, there is also room for improvement. Many 
member states – including Germany, which played an 
active role in protecting the principle of subsidiarity and 
guaranteeing German sovereign statehood – have shown 
a lack of commitment to the EU Adaptation Strategy and 
perhaps because of that, the 2018 evaluation thereof 
concluded that the objectives of the blueprint “have not 
been completely fulfilled”.47 For instance, at the time 
of publishing the evaluation, three member states – 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Latvia – did not have a NAS. In fact, 
not only were none of the priority knowledge gaps48 fully 
closed, but new ones emerged, too. 
This has partly to do with the fact that knowledge gaps 
were not presented specifically according to sectors but 
rather remained open-ended – which complicated their 
correct measuring. Although knowledge “may never be 
complete and certain”, the evaluation report highlighted 
that uncertainty is “no excuse for inaction” as it can be 
incorporated in modelling as well as transparent and open 
decision-making.49 Progress in mainstreaming climate 
adaptation in areas where the EU has exclusive competence 
(e.g. trade, fisheries) has also been insufficient.50
Many member states have shown a lack 
of commitment to the EU Adaptation 
Strategy. The 2018 evaluation thereof 
concluded that the objectives of the 
blueprint “have not been completely 
fulfilled”.
 
Moreover, the Strategy seems to have been reactive 
by nature, with a strong focus on covering the costs of 
climate-induced disasters instead of investing to avoid 
disaster risks. The Commission itself has estimated that 
for every euro spent in DRR and preparedness, savings of 
€4 to €7 can be generated.51 It is time for the EU to reflect 
this logic in its own actions.
The Commission has estimated that for 
every euro spent in DRR and preparedness, 
savings of €4 to €7 can be generated.
The application of CAP rules is a case in point. For 
example, farmers have received advanced direct 
payments in weather-afflicted regions.53 While this might 
administer a short-term safeguard against economic 
losses, it places an increasing strain on financial flows 
in the long run as they are not designed to deal with 
the multiplying impacts of climate change. Instead, the 
focus should be to proactively create the conditions for 
the agriculture sector to become climate-neutral and 
-resilient. To sum it up, EU “[g]oals to minimize and adapt 
to climate change, protect the environment and promote 
rural development are poorly served.”54
The Union’s disaster response mechanisms – the EU  
Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and EU Solidarity 
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Fund – are also faced with growing criticism from  
experts for their weak coordination with regional 
and local authorities, and focus on a reactive instead 
of preventive approach.55 In its annual report on the 
implementation of humanitarian aid and civil protection 
policies, the European Commission also referred to the 
inadequate funding of the UCPM, which is made all the 
starker by the accelerating frequency and severity of 
climate-induced and hazard-related risks.56 The 2018 
review of the Strategy expressed that the renewed UCPM 
was expected to strengthen the link between climate 
adaptation and DRR.
The EU still does not have a single 
standardised data collection and recording 
system for disaster losses.
The challenges do not end there. In 2018, the ECA 
released two reports worth mentioning. One focused 
on the Flood Directive and highlighted issues like 
insufficient funding for flood planning action and a 
lack of up-to-date knowledge on probable impacts.57 
The other concentrated on the looming threat posed by 
desertification and noted that while measures are being 
taken to repel this challenge, there is a lack of coherence 
with legislation.58 There are no explicit directives or 
regulations concerning desertification, nor any specific 
funding. Such disparities and disjointedness point  
to a lack of long-term planning and the absence of a 
dynamic perspective. 
Lastly, the EU still does not have a single standardised data 
collection and recording system for disaster losses despite 
the recommendations of the JRC59 and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As 
put aptly by the OECD’s Council on Disaster Risk Financing 
Strategies (to which most EU member states adhere), all 
data on assets, structural vulnerabilities, hazards and past 
losses should be produced, gathered, shared and made 
publicly available60 to quantify potential exposures. 
Additionally, countries should consistently carry out 
and coordinate post-disaster loss assessments with the 
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private sector to better evaluate exposures to disaster 
risk.61 The absence of a single standardised disaster loss 
data collection and recording system particularly affects 
local authorities. Standardised information sharing and 
the development of standardised stress tests and solid 
guidelines for local NASs and NAPs should become an 
integral part of the relations between the different levels 
of government.  
The new adaptation strategy should address these 
shortcomings ambitiously. While acknowledging that the 
choice of adaptation actions depends, to some extent, 
on local circumstances, this updated blueprint should 
focus on helping both public and private actors to address 
the growing impacts of climate change in Europe, push 
for binding national legislation which requires local 
adaptation plans and disseminate public and private 
financial assistance. Ultimately, however, if member states 
do not fully commit – as seen in the current Strategy –, the 
benefits of a renewed strategy will be severely curtailed.
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Chapter 3: Identifying challenges, areas for European 
added value and gaps in the current framework
3.1.   GENERAL CHALLENGES
Adaptation policy in the EU is facing several 
challenges. These include limited public awareness 
and an insufficient sense of urgency. Moreover, climate 
adaptation – contrary to mitigation – is not viewed as 
a politically pressing issue. There are also coordination 
problems across the different levels of governance and a 
suboptimal allocation of resources.
Adaption measures do not necessarily 
require huge investments. They do, 
however, demand smart planning.
q  Public awareness: Despite the rising frequency and 
intensity of climate change-related events and their 
devastating impact, some politicians, government 
authorities and some media overlook or downplay 
the link between natural hazard events and climate 
change. This fosters a misperception that events are 
sporadic and unrelated and not part of a dynamic and 
structural transformation of socioecological systems. 
These misperceptions then feed back into a lack 
of adaptation or maladaptation, or in other words, 
incomplete, faulty or inadequate adaptation.
q  Political priority and polarisation: Academic 
literature confirms that climate adaptation is  
“seen as less politically pressing than other 
issues”62 – including mitigation –, especially at the 
local level. This is even more interesting given that 
climate adaptation, contrary to mitigation, is seen 
as place-based and therefore very relevant to local 
governments.63 Furthermore, both adaptation and 
mitigation policies but also climate change more 
generally have become enmeshed in the so-called 
culture wars, where the debate on climate change 
diverts from science to ideology, culture and values64 
and is exposed to growing political polarisation. If 
certain political parties develop a climate-sceptic 
political narrative and argue against the likes of 
carbon taxes, lifestyle changes and investments 
in climate resilience, and adaptation efforts could 
be more heavily scrutinised, shelved or scrapped 
altogether. 
q  Coordination: Adaptation requires coordination 
between different sectors and levels of government 
that are beyond the local-to-national level. In addition, 
despite some evident functional synergies between 
different policy areas relevant for climate adaptation, 
silo thinking persists due to the multidisciplinary 
nature of adaptation and the different professional 
and policy communities involved which compete for 
limited financial resources.
q  Resources: Resources to invest in climate adaptation 
include not only the financial, but also technology, 
information, skills and time. On the one hand, 
public resources – especially at the local level – will 
be insufficient to cope with the magnitude of the 
challenge. On the other, private resources confront 
less immediate returns on investments in climate 
adaptation. Two challenges arise from this: firstly, 
the need to understand that both private and public 
players are responsible for their actions in their 
respective spheres. The second concerns the extent 
and method in which the private and public sectors can 
collaborate to de-risk investment and reduce avoidable 
costs as much as possible. In light of this challenge, 
an alignment between the private and public sectors 
is very much needed. If building climate resilience 
was integrated in the regular, day-to-day decisions 
of building and maintaining critical infrastructure 
in sectors like transport, water management, energy 
systems, building stock and soil management, it could 
prevent massive future damages and losses. Adaptation 
measures do not necessarily require huge investments. 
They do, nevertheless, demand smart planning.
3.2.   AREAS FOR EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE
The general challenges (see section 3.1.) reveal a 
difficult environment for the boosting of political action 
on climate adaptation. However, there are important 
areas where EU action and support can help foster the 
continent’s resilience to climate change (see section 1.2.)
As will be explained in the following sections, there is 
room for improvement in the conversion of knowledge 
into action, coordination between insurers and the public 
sector, adoption of nature-based infrastructural solutions, 
and build-up of more effective funding frameworks for 
both EU money and private investment. We will first 
identify and study the different gaps in the current 
adaptation strategy, the overall approach to adaptation 
and the main areas of action before putting forward a 
series of recommendations which address these issues.
3.2.1.  Knowledge: The information gap
Although studies show that there is no clear link between 
the provision of environmental information in and of 
itself and the influencing of behaviours, “we must […] 
guard against the danger that what we can measure 
becomes the sum total of what we aim to achieve.”65 
Despite these challenges, organisations like the World 
Bank are convinced that communication to raise 
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awareness, reinforce preparedness and encourage the 
willingness to adapt is necessary.66
Thus, arguably, the Sendai Framework’s recommendations 
on education and training for prevention and protection 
are an essential starting point for awareness.67 
Policymakers’ and citizens’ access to information about 
the magnitude, location and exposure to climate-related 
hazards is but one of the many determinants of behaviour 
change68 and as such can play an effective role in DRR 
and adaptation. Information helps educate the public, 
industry and authorities about responsible behaviour 
and incentivises preventive action, thus reducing the 
cost of post-disaster interventions. Publicly collected 
and recorded, standardised and open-source data, risks 
assessments and open-source hazard modelling can aid 
national and regional bodies to manage risk and shape 
their investment decisions. They are also a crucial part of 
any insurance.69
At the EU level, over the last years, a vast amount of 
knowledge on climate-related risks has been developed 
and disseminated through instruments like Copernicus 
and Climate-ADAPT. In addition, methodologies available 
to private actors in cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) and 
scenarios are becoming increasingly robust.
However, when it comes to turning knowledge into action, 
limitations persist. Besides the inherent limitations of 
CBAs,70 analyses in general face the following challenges:
q  Difficulties of factoring in long-term dynamics. While 
many risk analyses, CBAs and scenarios provide 
guidance on short-term resilience, they generally do 
not capture the risks associated with a large increase 
in temperature over the long term. This results in 
insufficient or maladaptive action.71
q  Difficulties of factoring in the value of indirect effects 
on society and environment as well as intangible 
impacts of disaster risks. These include unemployment 
or increasing mortality rates as a result of changing 
patterns of disease from sources such as certain species 
of mosquitoes, or damages to cultural heritage through 
greater exposure to severe weather events and change 
in average climatic conditions.
q  The lack of attention to non-climatic factors, cross-
sectorial interactions and international impacts when 
reviewing climate vulnerabilities in CBAs and scenarios. 
For example, careful reflection on social vulnerability 
factors would allow for a better understanding of the 
social justice ramifications of climate change, as some 
groups suffer more than others.72
Together with the limits mentioned above,  
heuristics – using shortcuts to produce ‘good enough’ 
solutions – explain to some extent why reactive  
and fragmented approaches still prevail over comprehensive 
preventive actions. For example, between 1991 and 2010, 
only 13% of global funding for disasters have gone to DRR 
efforts, while 87% went to post-event relief.73 All of the 
aspects is a challenging task and we may never be able 
to close the knowledge gap entirely, as acknowledged by 
the European Commission.74 Nonetheless, there is room 
for more effective use of information at the EU level, both 
in terms of reducing fragmentation in awareness and 
information asymmetries and translating knowledge into 
preventive policy responses.
Between 1991 and 2010, only 13% of global 
funding for disasters have gone to DRR 
efforts, while 87% went to post-event relief. 
3.2.2.  Insurance: The protection gap
Insurance is the best-known tool for risk sharing and 
transfer75 and as such, it has been embraced as a tool to 
buffer against the financial effects of climate variability and 
change in international climate impact-related discourses 
since the early 1990s76 and features in the Paris Agreement 
and the Sendai Framework. Insurance is also seen by the 
EU in its current Adaptation Strategy as central in the 
reinforcement of societal resilience to climate change. 
Despite its long trajectory as an important instrument 
to both enhance resilience and finance the recovery 
from climate change attributed events that are extreme, 
sufficiently random, infrequent and non-gradual,77 most 
economic losses derived from climate-related impacts since 
the 1980s were uninsured and therefore unrecoverable.78 
The high level of uninsured assets can be partly explained by 
the fact that people tend to understate the rare probability 
of highly impactful events and as risk perceptions across 
the EU bloc vary this makes the application of insurance 
schemes complicated. As shown by renowned scholars 
Kunreuther and Pauly, even when insurance “is offered at 
favourable premiums […] people often fail to purchase [it] 
against low-probability high-loss events.”79
Furthermore, in some countries, gaps in insurance 
uptake are caused by a lack of awareness, ineffective legal 
systems80 or the population’s large exposure to hazards 
as well as distributional issues. Within the EU, insurance 
uptake tends to be lower in Southern, Central and Eastern 
countries (see Figure 10, page 22). Of the extreme weather 
and climate-related events occurring in the EU between 
1980 and 2017, insured losses varied between 2% in Greece 
and 70% in the UK.81 From an EU perspective such a 
fragmentation poses a two-fold challenge: differentiated 
levels of insurance uptake can impact the Union’s 
resources since countries that receive large amounts of EU 
investment tend to be those that suffer the most from the 
protection gap. It can also lead to tensions if funds (e.g. 
the EU Solidarity Fund) are primarily spent on damages 
suffered by those who did not adopt preventive measures 
(e.g. by taking an insurance).
To reduce the number of unrecoverable losses, that is, 
to address the protection gap, prevention and resilience 
building efforts should be doubled. Prevention, in other 
words, not only pays off but also improves risk quality  
and makes it more insurable. However, since certain layers 
and sectors of the population – notably low-income,  
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high-risk people – might struggle with affording an 
insurance, measures like tax credits or smart subsidies 
could be explored to ensure that no one is left behind. 
Aware of the need to build a functioning insurance market 
to strengthen the EU’s overall adaptation efforts, the EU 
Adaptation Strategy included the promotion of products 
and services by insurance as one of its priorities. Prior 
to that, the Commission’s Green Paper on the insurance 
of natural and man-made disasters had attempted to 
“encourage improvement in the ways insurers help to 
manage climate change risks”.83 More specifically, the 
document sought to improve the market penetration 
of natural disaster risk insurance and unleash the full 
potential of insurance pricing to promote risk-awareness, 
prevention and mitigation, as well as long-term resilience 
in investment and business decisions. 
However, the 2018 review of the EU Adaptation Strategy 
concluded that the “action on insurance and the financial 
sector may not have been sufficient to overcome hurdles 
for public-private cooperation” and that “EU action has 
yet to bring clear results.” The EAV resides in “enabling 
cooperation between governments and insurers, raising 
awareness about the coverage gap and about the need for 
governments to integrate insurance in the management 
of all climate risks.”84 The European Parliament, one of 
the co-legislators, unequivocally stressed in a November 
2019 resolution the need “for the insurance industry to 
invest in adaptation”.85 
As hinted at in the 2018 review, the insurance market 
will only function if the public and private sectors work 
together.86 Governments have a crucial role to play in 
shaping a policy, regulatory and legal environment, 
addressing market and regulatory shortcomings and 
weaknesses such as information asymmetries and  
low-level risk awareness among individuals.87 Conversely, 
private insurers have room for improvement with respect 
to investment in preventive risk reduction as it remains 
considerably lower than public insurers’ efforts.88
The insurance market is currently also characterised by the 
fragmentation of risk transfer type: ex post compensation 
by public mechanisms, private insurance or both; levels of 
compulsion of insurance uptake; and such. All of them are 
differently and often insufficiently integrated into national 
adaptation decision-making processes or broader climate 
risk management strategies.89 Future EU efforts should, 
therefore, try to address this.
There is a fundamental issue to be 
addressed by the future EU Adaptation 
Strategy: the misperception surrounding 
the function of insurance.
However, there is a more fundamental issue to be 
addressed by the future EU Adaptation Strategy: the 
misperception surrounding the function of insurance, 
which is viewed in many cases as a stand-alone risk 
management tool rather than an integral part of 
the toolbox for adaptation. This toolbox should also 
include the four priorities for action present in the 
Sendai Framework, namely understanding disaster risk, 
strengthening disaster risk governance (to manage disaster 
risk through i.e. data sharing), ex ante planning for risk 
reduction and resilience building, enhancing disaster 
preparedness for effective response and build back better 
(BBB) in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Risk reduction priority tools and insurance recognised by 
Sendai can be further linked through many channels, in 
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the eyes of some scholars. Some of the options for linking 
them include risk awareness raising, risk pricing, direct 
financing of risk reduction measures and adopting risk 
reduction as a requirement for insurance.90 However, the 
IPCC see a “weak” evidence in the claims that insurance 
can “directly provide incentives for reducing risk” and 
believe that the “presence of many counteracting factors 
often leads to disincentives”.91 It is therefore fair to say 
that if insurers want to better promote risk reduction 
practices, a reform of the sector will be necessary.
In light of this analysis, Lorant, Linnerooth-Bayer 
and Hanger,92 building on the work by Surminski and 
Eldridge,93 suggest ways for insurers to contribute more 
effectively to DRR, inter alia:
q  Making better use of hazard maps: The collection and 
provision of information about risk can help drive 
individual action and set up the appropriate regulation 
and standards aimed at DRR. A good example of this is 
HORA, the Austrian nationwide risk zoning system for 
flood and natural disasters (see Chapter 4).
q  Rewarding risk mitigation with premium discounts: For 
instance, through price signalling, homeowners who 
fortify their roof decks against hail and wind damage 
could be charged with a lower premium or deductible. 
The discount depends on the kind of risk management 
activities undertaken by the policyholder and can 
allow insurers to save costs linked to potential large 
claims. Barriers persists, however, as households 
and governments tend to underestimate the risks 
in comparison to the upfront cost of investment. At 
the same time, insurers could be reluctant to engage 
directly without a guarantee that the beneficiary of 
the investment will not choose a competitor once 
the investment is performed. A long-term insurance 
contract with dynamic and transparent risk-based 
pricing and premium discounts for risk reduction could 
strengthen the incentives to reduce risks for both the 
demand and supply side of the insurance market.94
q  Monitoring household risk management improvements 
at the member state level (i.e. households insurance 
against adverse shocks to financing needs, income 
and assets): Household risk management tends to be 
very limited and is often completely absent from low-
income households.
q  Inserting conditions or warranties into contracts: Risk 
reduction and climate resilience building can be 
imposed as a condition for a policy to be operative. 
For instance, if the insurance holder does not take any 
measures against the risk to which they are exposed, 
the pay-out will be lower. This approach can however 
be resisted by policyholders if no appropriate “carrot” 
is added, for instance in the form of premium discounts 
or tax incentives.
3.2.3.  Infrastructure: The grey bias
In 2013, the European Commission defined green 
infrastructure as a “strategically planned network of 
natural and semi-natural areas with other environmental 
features designed and managed to deliver a wide range of 
ecosystem services.”95 Ecosystem services deliver a range 
of environmental and socioeconomic benefits, including 
the maintenance and improvement of ecological 
functions through, among others, conservation, 
connectivity building in ecological networks and the 
promotion of green spaces. The EU recognises the 
value of green infrastructure, as demonstrated in the 
adoption of the EU Strategy on Green Infrastructure, 
and the launch of the EU-wide network Natura 2000 
initiative of natural and semi-natural areas that tackles 
habitat loss while contributing to smart and sustainable 
socioeconomic growth. Natura 2000 provides a legal and 
organisational setting which contributes to the efficiency, 
long-term security and cost-effectiveness of green 
infrastructure investments (e.g. by restoring floodplains). 
Although the main driver of EU initiatives on green 
infrastructure is the protection of biodiversity, nature-
based approaches are seen – including by the European 
Parliament – as crucial enablers of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation, too.96
Although the main driver of EU initiatives 
on green infrastructure is the protection of 
biodiversity, nature-based approaches are 
seen as crucial enablers of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation, too. 
Firstly, urban greening is a valuable intervention 
against the detrimental urban heat island effect. Urban 
areas tend to heat disproportionally partly because of 
the impermeable and reflective materials used in the 
construction of most buildings (i.e. grey infrastructure) 
and the use of short-sighted grey (mal)adaptation 
measures (e.g. indoor air conditioning), hence the value 
of green infrastructure in moderating high temperatures, 
sequestering carbon and reducing building energy use 
altogether. An example of how green infrastructure can 
tackle these issues can be found in the city of Barcelona. 
Barcelona’s Tree Master Plan for 2017-37 and Green 
Infrastructure and Biodiversity Plan 2020 have put the 
emphasis on the planting and managing of trees to 
moderate the urban climate by cooling it and prevent 
local flooding by helping to reduce the amount of storm 
water runoff. 
Second, and in connection to this, green infrastructure 
helps manage flood risks, as contrary to impermeable grey 
infrastructure it allows for water absorption as well as 
wastewater treatment.
Third, green infrastructure enhances general ecosystem 
resilience by reducing habitat fragmentation (e.g. through 
the development of corridors for species migration or 
expansion of core conservation areas) and therefore 
strengthening the ability of the ecological system to 
absorb disturbances.
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In addition to the adaptation benefits mentioned above, 
green infrastructure can also play a role in climate change 
mitigation, biodiversity conservation, water management, 
food supply and provision of health and social benefits 
through, for instance, the creation/expansion of 
recreational spaces.97 Intuitively, these numerous 
priceless benefits should enhance green infrastructure’s 
political appeal. As an example, the analysis of the ‘wide 
green dikes’ built along the Dutch part of the Dollard 
estuary reveals four primary advantages compared to a 
traditional dike: lower initial costs (based on standard 
unit prices), greater ease of doing repairs, increased 
adaptability and enhanced spatial quality.98
Despite the clear pros of green 
infrastructure and the fact that it is often a 
cheaper and more durable investment than 
grey infrastructure, the latter continues to 
be privileged in the adaptation discussion. 
However, despite the clear pros of green infrastructure 
and the fact that it is often a cheaper and more durable 
investment than grey infrastructure,99 the latter continues 
to be privileged in the adaptation discussion. This is due to 
many reasons, the main being that grey infrastructure has 
a clearer asset life, depreciation and return on investment. 
Moreover, green infrastructure as a concept suffers from 
a lack of scientific, socio-political and decision-making 
impetus. All of these challenges combined with a weaker 
financial support for green infrastructure, in contrast to 
the historical support provided for the grey infrastructure, 
continue to prevent a larger use of green infrastructure in 
the context of climate change adaptation,100 and despite a 
generally supportive EU policy framework.101
3.2.4.  Funding: The investment gap
With its considerable impact on EU agriculture, energy, 
transport, research, and regional development, the EU 
budget constitutes important leverage for climate-related 
investments. In the context of climate adaptation, the 
MFF plays a relevant role as it provides financial support 
to disaster response and can bolster investment in 
disaster risk reduction. In the budget cycle 2014-20, the 
EU is said to have spent approximately €206 billion on 
climate action – including mitigation and adaptation – 
based on its 20% climate mainstreaming objective. It  
is estimated that during the current budget cycle,  
€62.1 billion were spent on climate adaptation, with 
investment in the EU’s agricultural sector taking the 
lion’s share of these interventions (€50.9 billion).102 
Figure 7 in Chapter 2 shows the share of interventions  
in climate action (i.e. mitigation, adaptation) and 
adaptation separately by the ESIF. It does not provide, 
however, a clear picture of the EU budget’s effective 
contribution to climate adaptation and mitigation. 
Hurdles related to funding include the fact that climate 
spending adopts a tracking methodology (known as Rio 
Markers) that tends to overestimate the budget’s actual 
contribution to climate action. Practically speaking, 
it estimates the volume of finance streams based on 
policy objectives as opposed to an exact quantification 
of spending. This has had a very pervasive effect in the 
case of adaptation. The definitions and eligibility criteria 
for climate adaptation projects leave the door open to 
different interpretations and inaccurate policy signals.103 
As a result, projects that are thought to be supporting 
adaptation efforts in one context may be maladaptive 
in another, depending on climatic, socioeconomic, 
environmental, cultural and institutional factors.104
Moreover, ex ante climate-related conditionalities 
concerning the promotion of climate change adaptation, 
risk prevention and management – prerequisites for 
the effective and efficient use of the EU funding for 
all European Structural and Investment funds – are 
hardly enforced as they suffer from institutional 
mismatching.105 Conditionalities have fallen primarily 
under the responsibility of the services managing 
the funds (i.e. DG Regional and Urban Policy or DG 
Agriculture and Rural Development), with limited to  
no role for the DGs responsible for climate action and 
the environment. 
The EU budget constitutes important 
leverage for climate-related investments: 
the EU is said to have spent approximately 
€206 billion of the MFF 2014-20 on  
climate action.
Additionally, contributions towards climate 
mainstreaming very often turn into an accounting 
exercise, partly because of the absence of any 
internationally agreed definition of what exactly counts 
as climate finance. Furthermore, while 20% of the EU 
budget should at present be spent on climate action 
explicitly, there are no ‘climate-proofing’ requirements 
for the remaining 80% of the budget. As the EU member 
states are currently negotiating the forthcoming budget 
cycle 2021-2027, the abovementioned shortcomings 
should be corrected. The EU will need to continue to 
invest in climate resilience if it is to confront the growing 
number and intensity of climate-related events – but 
as the budget is limited, the money needs to be spent 
wisely. In other words, the share of the budget that is 
not explicitly earmarked for climate action should not 
be spent on projects and malpractices that counter 
adaptation efforts.
Public finance, however, is not and should not be the 
only funding that can be mobilised for DRR. While public 
support has an important signalling role and is crucial 
for protecting public services that are at the frontline of 
disaster management and prevention such as emergency 
services or healthcare, private finance can and should 
provide a significant contribution to increase the EU’s 
resilience to climate change. 
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However, challenges remain, as most investment tends to 
overlook climate-related risk. Several reasons explain this:
q  Firstly, the large amount of information on disaster 
risk, accumulated mostly by the insurance sector based 
on claims data, is not necessarily available due to 
personal and business privacy concerns and legislation. 
q  Secondly, climate scenarios remain somewhat 
insufficient, as they tend to focus on a future where 
the rise in temperature is close to internationally 
agreed climate targets, thereby failing to take into 
consideration higher levels of warming and  
non-climatic influential factors (e.g. social, political, 
legislative, economic).
q  Thirdly, adaptation is a context-specific concept that 
can be considered a process rather than an outcome.106 
As the EU reforms its investment-related legislation 
following the Union’s Sustainable Finance Action 
Plan,107 there is now an opportunity to create an 
incentivising framework that includes DRR and climate 
resilience at the core of its finance considerations.
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Chapter 4: Roadmap for action – Recommendations 
for a renewed adaptation strategy
Due to the magnitude of the climate challenge, climate 
adaptation efforts need to be part of a system-wide policy 
built around two guiding principles: the need to truly 
mainstream adaptation; and shift from post-disaster 
responses to prevention, risk reduction and resilience 
building. Considering this, how can the gaps identified 
in the previous section be addressed by a renewed EU 
adaptation strategy?
4.1.   BRIDGING THE INFORMATION GAP
How can the EU improve the quality of its knowledge 
and ensure that sufficient policy guidance is provided? 
Although the volume of knowledge acquired thanks to 
coordinated EU action is not negligible, findings have not 
informed policy action sufficiently. The three priorities 
for action in this area at the EU level should, therefore, 
be to (i) conduct economic research which considers the 
costs of adaptation and non-action comprehensively;108 
(ii) harmonise risk perception among individuals, groups, 
sectors and countries (which is not an easy task considering 
the diversity of audiences);  (iii) ensure that knowledge can 
be translated into guidance for decision-making. In order 
for adaptation strategies to be implemented successfully, it 
is crucial that decision-makers have free and user-friendly 
access to the relevant data and knowledge about climate 
risks in their respective regions.
In addition to showing an understanding of the policy 
cycle; collaborating with receptive policymakers; and 
accompanying evidence with effective campaigning, 
insider influencing strategies (i.e. direct lobbying) and 
political mobilisation, some key recommendations for 
bridging the information gap are the following:
RECOMMENDATION 1
 
Value information on losses as a public good. Better access 
to research data on hazards, exposure, past losses and 
assets promotes scientific advancement, facilitates 
scientists’ designing of risk models and allows society 
to protect itself better. The lack of publicly available 
compiled data might shield companies and authorities 
from liability if affected residents struggle to attribute 
responsibility for damages to their assets. For example, 
owners of a house on a riverbank for which flood maps 
were not available upon purchase might struggle to 
pinpoint who is liable in case of a destructive flood. 
Understanding knowledge about losses as a public good 
can also be justified by the need to ensure sound public 
expenditures. Climate change impacts take a toll on public 
infrastructure – that is, on the public purse. Considering 
this issue, the Council could push member states to 
release information on losses, and mandate and resource 
the European Environment Agency to analyse the data. 
Alternatively, EU countries could consider creating a new 
agency, the ‘EU Risk Management Agency’, to deal with this 
task as well as the others described below.
Climate change impacts take a toll on 
public infrastructure – that is, on the 
public purse.
RECOMMENDATION 2
 
Empower the European Environment Agency to provide 
more comprehensive monitoring and mapping of risks, 
highlighting the cost of non-adaptation under different 
climate scenarios, for different sectors and geographical 
regions; and disseminating it widely among the general 
public through accessible online tools (e.g. Climate-
ADAPT) and summarised evidence. The Agency’s funds 
should also be increased to analyse how to mainstream 
climate adaptation comprehensively and identify the 
most effective measures. These findings and risk maps 
should then become an inherent part of the planning of 
future (re)construction projects. 
Additionally, the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) should be resourced and 
continue to analyse potential climate-sensitive exposures 
in insurance investment portfolios and pension funds 
and ensure that the information is transparent. This 
includes working with the insurance sector to broaden the 
number of European (re)insurance groups participating 
in the stress test exercise that exposes them to a climate 
change-attributed natural catastrophe scenario.  
RECOMMENDATION 3
 
Put in place a single, unified and easy-to-access EU-wide 
data collection for disaster damages and losses, as well as a 
transparent reporting mechanism. As mentioned in a JRC 
study, both collection and reporting mechanisms ought to 
be “consistent in terms of methodologies, metadata and 
procedures”.109 Standardisation helps ensure the quality 
and usability of analytical tools for both decision-makers 
and households. Free access to, visual clarity110 and 
comparability of data reduce information asymmetries 
and misalignments in risk perception and are therefore 
essential in risk reduction education. Moreover, from an 
international perspective, having a single and unified 
framework for damage and loss data recording and a 
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transparent reporting mechanism would bring significant 
advantages to the systematic reporting on the Sendai 
Framework indicators – which member states have 
committed to.
An ‘EU Risk Management Agency’ would 
combine the tasks of data collection, free 
and transparent reporting, early warning, 
disaster risk management, resilience 
building and risk finance.
If interpreted loosely, Articles 2 and 3 of the “regulation 
on the European Environment Agency and the European 
Environment Information and Observation Network” 
could be explored as a legal basis to extend the mandate 
of the former to coordinate the collection, analysis and 
reporting of data – provided that it is properly resourced 
to do so. Alternatively, should the extension of the 
mandate not be agreed, an EU agency – we suggest the 
name ‘EU Risk Management Agency’ – could be created. 
This pan-European agency would combine the tasks of 
data collection, free and transparent reporting, early 
warning, disaster risk management, resilience building 
and risk finance.
RECOMMENDATION 4
 
Strengthen building codes through mandatory 
standards and supporting the use of insurers’ data 
for zoning and construction standards. Given that it 
is considerably more expensive to rebuild homes than 
build them from scratch, member states should engage 
with the standardisation community and insurance sector 
to strengthen and update building codes for designs, 
constructions and operations regularly. Up-to-date codes 
not only offer enhanced protection against disasters 
and manmade hazards, but also make communities 
more resilient and lowers the price of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation.111 An example of a secure code 
is the requirement of tighter building envelopes or better 
insulating windows.
Insurers’ data provides public administrations and 
developers with zoning, infrastructure and housing-
related information that can help correct information 
asymmetries and, by extension, maladaptation. For 
instance, in the UK, the insurance industry engages with 
public authorities on flood defence funding, land zoning 
and construction standards.
RECOMMENDATION 5
 
Bolster the efforts to develop EU metrics to evaluate the 
impacts of adaptation efforts. The European Commission 
should convene an interdisciplinary group of experts to 
work on a metric that, similarly to mitigation-related 
metrics (e.g. a one-tonne reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions will always the same impact, regardless of where 
the mitigation project has taken place), allows for the 
understanding of the feasibility, costs, effectiveness and 
likely extent of the implementation of adaptation options. 
Any proposed metric should go hand in hand with the 
no-harm assessment principle to assess the environmental 
and cultural impacts of adaptation projects.112 
So far, at the EU level, the technical expert group on 
sustainable finance has to some extent embraced the 
need for economic activities eligible for Taxonomy, 
to avoid significant harm to a set of environmental 
objectives.113 The group is also focusing on a qualitative 
and not quantitative screening given the absence of 
measured baselines and accepted metrics, and “the 
complexity associated with defining eligibility of finance 
in the case of adaptation of an economic activity”.114
RECOMMENDATION 6
 
The Commission and member states should 
encourage the constitution of structured discussion 
forums where policymakers, the scientific community, 
businesses and local communities – especially the most 
vulnerable and exposed – can engage in information 
exchanges on bottom-up and co-designed adaptation 
options. This idea is reflected to some extent in the 
November 2019 European Parliament resolution.115
4.2.   CLOSING THE PROTECTION GAP
Dealing with climate change calls for a balance between 
adapting to, tolerating and insuring against the impacts of 
climate change.116 How can the EU improve the market for 
DRR, enhancing insurance’s potential from a traditionally 
compensatory role to a damage prevention one? 
Two main obstacles limit the closing  
of the protection gap at the EU level: 
intra-EU fragmentation, and insufficient 
integration of the role of insurance into a 
wider vision for DRR. 
Two main obstacles limit the closing of the protection gap 
at the EU level: intra-EU fragmentation, which financially 
exposes public authorities to disaster risk to varying 
degrees, dependent on their insurance; and insufficient 
integration of the role of insurance into a wider vision 
for DRR. EU measures aiming to reduce the protection 
gap should, therefore, focus on the following chain of 
action: (i) increasing awareness about the need for risk 
management among stakeholders; (ii) fostering resilience 
which focuses on risk reduction; (iii) ensuring that the 
remaining risk is insured or insurable as much as possible 
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through private means; and (iv) defining a role for public 
finance to provide a backstop for those cases where 
previous intervention (i.e. awareness, risk reduction, 
private insurance) is insufficient, thus supplementing the 
insurance provided by the market. 
To this end, the authors suggest that the renewed 
adaptation strategy focus on: 
RECOMMENDATION 7
 
Make use of NASs and NAPs to increase awareness of 
climate risk management among stakeholders. Standardised 
information sharing and the development of standardised 
stress tests and solid guidelines for NASs and NAPs should 
become a crucial part of the relations between the different 
levels of government, include a strong educational 
dimension on risk management and address risk transfer as 
a part of a wider discourse on risk management.
RECOMMENDATION 8
 
Guide the introduction of smart subsidies, tax deductions 
or insurance vouchers to the poor and vulnerable groups. 
Although insurance companies are expected to provide 
adequate pricing, in order to not leave the vulnerable 
and poor behind, incentives that ease the pressure of 
risk premiums (e.g. insurance tax deductions) should 
be considered by national tax authorities. They should 
properly reflect climate risk, and specify the actions 
that would reduce excessive risk-taking and could be 
supported by EU guidance.
However, this support should only be provided for climate 
change insurance products that are “needs-based, 
adjusted to the local context and embedded into holistic 
risk management and resilience-building strategies.”117 
Insurance vouchers, a more innovative option proposed 
by Kunreuther for low- and middle-income residents 
who cannot afford flood insurance coverage at risk-
based premiums, could also be explored.118 As argued 
more recently by Kousky and Kunreuther, the voucher 
programme could be tied to a loan programme for 
investments in loss reduction measures, which would be 
linked to the property and rendered affordable through 
reductions in risk-based premiums. Future studies are 
nevertheless needed to estimate the costs and impacts 
to public authorities and the benefits in terms of reduced 
expected losses in the future.119 
RECOMMENDATION 9
 
Encourage member states to include investment 
opportunities to reduce climate change-related risks in their 
budgets and planning. The first step could be for the EU 
to push the EU Semester recommendations forward. As 
mentioned in the European Green Deal communication, 
the Commission will use the European Semester to 
“ensure that all available planning tools for the European 
Green Deal” and specifically national energy and climate 
plans are “fit for purpose” and implemented effectively.120 
Since many member states with climate adaptation goals 
have included them in their draft national energy and 
climate plans,121 the Commission could start by assessing 
the budget of those countries.
However, since climate change is already taking a toll on 
financial stability “when asset prices adjust rapidly to 
reflect unexpected realizations of transition or physical 
risks” and on monetary policy by “slowing productivity 
growth […] and heightening uncertainty and inflation 
volatility”,122 actions beyond the European Semester 
recommendations could be explored. Given that climate 
change puts a strain on public finances and other public 
investment projects and threatens the Treaty-embedded 
principle of fiscal stability (Article 119(3) TFEU), the 
European Commission could take a proactive role in 
encouraging member states to factor these risks into their 
planning processes and national budgets.
Plus, if climate change-attributed impacts are factored 
into the budget planning process, it will be easier to 
calculate the benefit of risk reduction in monetary 
terms via the reduction in annual average losses due to 
climate change, for example. Furthermore, as suggested 
by scholars Hochrainer-Stigler and Lorant, if the risk is 
accounted for, then some risk reduction investments 
could be financed by the insurance sector and transferred 
in order to decrease premiums.123
RECOMMENDATION 10
 
Create an EU-wide weather and climate risk insurance 
pool, or voluntary regional risk pool. This is all the more 
important in a time when the aggravation of catastrophes 
is linked to increasing interdependencies among  
member states.124 Macro-level schemes have several 
potential advantages:125
1)  They are able to aggregate risk, diversify risk profiles 
and, by building economies of scale, allow for reduced 
premium costs. 
2)  Pay-outs can more quickly reach a larger number of 
beneficiaries if the mechanism used for transferring it 
(and the quality of fiduciary management, should there 
be a third party managing the assets) is sound. 
3)  Pooling risks creates a more stable, diversified and 
less-capital intensive portfolio. This allows countries 
to retain some of the risks through joint reserves 
and capital, and shift excess risk more cheaply to the 
reinsurance and capital markets. 
4)  By effectively putting a price tag on risk, risk pools 
can create incentives for member states to invest in 
risk reduction, and move away from humanitarian 
assistance and disaster assistance toward proactive 
planned development. 
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5)  Risk pools would help member states cope with the 
macroeconomic and fiscal consequences of disasters. 
Existing examples like the African Risk Capacity, 
Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing 
Initiative or the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance 
Facility (which launched thanks to a contribution by 
the European Commission, among other partners) 
could provide some inspiration for the building of an 
EU-wide pool. 
Pooling risks creates a more stable, 
diversified and less-capital intensive 
portfolio.
This regional pool would work as a public backstop, 
stepping in when risk is no longer privately insurable. 
The pool would make requirements as to how the 
disbursements ought to be used by requesting member 
states to communicate details about contingency 
management, and it would also set conditions for  
DRR or climate change adaptation that the agency  
would verify. 
To avoid freeriding, strengthened disaster risk 
management systems,and incentivised solid work on 
climate adaptation and mitigation, member states 
exceeding their national risk budget could be excluded 
from the backstop or forced to provide more resources 
and participate in risk reduction and resilience-building 
measures, while those more successful at reducing risk at 
the national level could provide lower contributions. 
4.3.   TACKLING THE GREY INFRASTRUCTURE 
BIAS
How can the EU level boost nature-based solutions 
in climate adaptation? Previous pages have outlined 
the multiple benefits of nature-based solutions for 
climate adaptation. However, there remain barriers 
to deployment. In addition to funding challenges, the 
difficulties of internalising the cobenefits of green 
solutions undermine the business case for them. The 
following recommendations address this issue:
RECOMMENDATION 11
 
Evaluate infrastructure investments on their climate 
resilience, mitigation potential and embedded carbon. Grey 
infrastructure usually implies the use of large amounts of 
cement and construction products, demanding energy- 
and emission-intensive production processes. Embedded 
carbon and an LCA, priced according to a shadow carbon 
price, as well as mitigation potential and climate resilience 
should be included in cost-effectiveness analyses when 
evaluating different options of infrastructure.
RECOMMENDATION 12
 
Explore a BBB requirement that does justice to the 
undervalued benefits of green infrastructure. Member 
states, with the support of the European Commission 
(in case of infrastructure paid for by EU funds), could 
foster a dialogue with the insurance industry to study 
whether and how insurance reimbursements could be 
made conditional upon the reconstruction of property 
post-disaster following BBB requirements. These 
requirements entail ensuring the climate-resilience of the 
infrastructure whilst contributing to mitigation efforts  
as much as possible.
RECOMMENDATION 13
 
Consider green infrastructure’s co-benefits when 
assessing adaptation options. These options should 
also compete based on the social, environmental and 
economic co-benefits of disaster risk management 
investments.126 Introducing relevant criteria which 
quantify the additional societal (i.e. mental and physical 
health, recreational) and environmental (i.e. climate 
change mitigation, protection of biodiversity) benefits 
of investment in adaptation could help the uptake of 
ecosystem-based options over grey ones, which are 
typically mono-functional. Strategic use of public 
procurement would be essential to this aim. A first step 
could be for the Commission to sponsor the building of 
green roofs in public schools throughout Europe.
4.4.   ADDRESSING THE FUNDING AND 
INVESTMENT GAP
How can the EU level improve the finance framework 
conditions to unleash investment in adaptation, 
overcoming the problem of limited return on 
investments? 
Credit rating agencies should be 
encouraged to rate corporations based  
on their resilience to climate risk.  
This would open up new markets for  
their products.
RECOMMENDATION 14
 
Integrate DRR and climate resilience efforts into insurance, 
investment risk models, capital requirements and rating 
agencies, all under the umbrella of the action plan on 
sustainable finance. A comprehensive taxonomy of 
sustainable investment should include an indication of 
the investment’s physical resilience to climate-related 
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natural hazards in the long term, to prevent institutional 
investors from supporting insufficiently adaptive or 
maladaptive investments. Although it is not part of 
their business field, credit rating agencies should be 
encouraged to rate corporations based on their resilience 
to climate risk. This would open up new markets for their 
products. Finally, disclosure requirements for financial 
and non-financial companies should extend to the 
reporting of climate risk exposure.
RECOMMENDATION 15
 
Agree on and consistently apply a climate risk proofing 
methodology across every MFF budget chapter. The 
EU budget can have non-negligible multiplier effects 
in policy areas such as energy or agriculture, thus 
highlighting the importance of factoring in adaptation 
concerns while not neglecting mitigation efforts. With a 
relatively small sum usually allocated to climate change 
spending explicitly (e.g. through the LIFE instrument), 
climate-proofing the entire budget to bring it in line with 
smart adaptation and mitigation objectives becomes all 
the more crucial. An interesting definition of climate-
proofing covers the energy efficiency principle, the 
consideration of specific decarbonisation pathways and 
resilience to adverse climate change impacts.127
RECOMMENDATION 16
 
Establish clear tracking methodologies and effective ex 
ante conditionalities for climate-related EU spending. 
Given the technical difficulties in determining the exact 
amount that is spent on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, the Commission could lead the efforts to 
conceptualise and establish clear tracking methodologies. 
Additionally, ex ante conditionalities for climate-related 
EU spending should be considered. A first step could be 
to make disbursements conditional to member states’ 
adoption of both NASs and NAPs. Moreover, EU spending 
should prioritise interventions that include smart climate 
adaptation coupled with mitigation as a primary objective.
RECOMMENDATION 17
 
Link the disbursement of the EU budget to the adoption 
and implementation of NASs and NAPs. The EU budget 
and funding instruments of the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development can be used as a powerful tool to upgrade 
member states’ actions on climate adaptation. First, 
MFF and EIB investments in climate adaptation should 
be aligned with the objectives outlined in the NASs and 
the actions foreseen in the NAPs. Second, EU money 
should be used to reward both ambitious and/or correctly 
implemented NAPs. The EIB spent €906.1 million in 
2018 solely on climate change adaptation, but almost ten 
member states – including two of three who did not yet 
have an NAS – did not benefit from this financing so it 
seems like a missed opportunity for many countries.128
A way of using EU money to incentivise member states 
to upgrade their plans, or reward good performance in 
implementing NASs and NAPs could be the creation 
of a risk reduction reserve that would be put aside and 
disbursed to incentivise member states to upgrade the 
plans’ ambitions or reward over-performance in their 
implementation. The evolution of insurance premiums 
would provide an objective, independent measure of the 
performance of investments in climate adaptation if wide 
insurance penetration and a risk signal are achieved – two 
conditions that are not yet met by many member states.
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Conclusion
The European Commission has announced that it will 
publish a new EU strategy on adaptation to climate 
change within the first two years of its mandate as part 
of the European Green Deal. This is a positive signal that 
the adaptation agenda will get the attention it deserves 
and demands. When working on the renewed strategy, the 
Commission will have to assess the mixed results yielded 
by the current one carefully.
As shown in this Issue Paper, although the strategy has 
proven to be a productive framework for the facilitation 
and support of activities throughout the EU and the 
spreading of some degree of visibility and knowledge 
on this file through Climate-ADAPT, several weaknesses 
persist. They concern the fact that none of the priority 
knowledge gaps has been fully closed, the progress on 
climate adaptation mainstreaming has been limited and 
the focus has been on post-disaster response actions as 
opposed to risk reduction and preparedness. Furthermore, 
the implementation of the Adaptation Strategy has 
suffered from the lack of political prioritisation of the 
adaptation file, silo thinking and insufficient resources 
allocated to ensure that the Strategy’s priority areas are 
properly implemented.
Member states cannot afford to kick  
the can further down the road and 
postpone the adoption of firm mitigation 
and adaptation measures, as the science  
is clear: we are running out of time.
To address those weaknesses and bring all of the member 
states on board, the Commission must pull out all of the 
stops decisively. Member states cannot afford to kick the 
can further down the road and postpone the adoption 
of firm mitigation and adaptation measures, as the 
science is clear: we are running out of time to contain 
GHG emissions and global-mean temperature increase 
within manageable limits. Policies have finally caught up 
with the science – at least on paper – as manifested in 
the European Green Deal and the climate neutrality goal 
embraced by the EU. Now it is time to translate them into 
concrete actions.
The scale of the challenge is daunting, and no member 
state will be able to face it on its own, hence the obvious 
need to attach more importance to the upcoming 
adaptation strategy and strengthen intra-EU cooperation 
in this field. The time is ripe to invest in climate  
resilience building. 
Drawing on the findings of two workshops organised  
in the framework of the EPC project “Building a  
climate-resilient Europe”, open-ended interviews 
with and valuable feedback provided by reviewers, 
and a literature review, this Paper provides a set of 
recommendations to address each of the weaknesses of 
the current Strategy. 
To close the information gap, the authors propose the 
following ideas: 
1.  Valuing information on losses as a public good.
2.  Empowering the European Environment Agency and 
EIOPA to provide more comprehensive monitoring and 
mapping of risks.
3.  Putting in place a single and unified data collection for 
pre- and post-disaster damages and losses as well as a 
transparent reporting mechanism.
4.  Strengthening building codes through local mandatory 
standards and supporting the use of insurers’ data for 
zoning and construction.
5.  Bolstering the efforts to develop EU metrics to evaluate 
the impacts of adaptation efforts. 
6.  Fostering structured discussion forums on bottom-up 
and co-designed adaptation options.
The protection gap could be narrowed by:
1.  Making use of the NASs and NAPs to increase awareness 
on climate risk management among stakeholders.
2.  Guiding the introduction of smart subsidies, tax 
deductions or insurance vouchers to the poor and 
vulnerable.
3.  Encouraging member states to include investment 
opportunities to reduce climate change-related risks  
in their budgets and planning.
4.  Creating an EU-wide weather and climate risk pool  
or voluntary regional risk pool.
To fight against the grey infrastructure bias, the authors 
recommend:
1.  Evaluating infrastructure investments based on their 
climate resilience, mitigation potential and embedded 
carbon. 
2.  Exploring a BBB requirement that that does justice  
to the undervalued benefits of green infrastructure.
3.  Considering green infrastructure’s co-benefits when 
assessing adaptation options.
Lastly, the EU should address the funding and investment 
gap that hampers the adaptation agenda by:
1.  Integrating DRR and climate resilience efforts 
into insurance, investment risk models, capital 
requirements and rating agencies, all under  
the umbrella of the action plan on sustainable  
finance.
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2.  Agreeing on and consistently applying a climate  
risk proofing methodology across every MFF  
budget chapter.
3.  Establishing clear tracking methodologies and effective 
ex ante conditionalities for climate-related  
EU spending.
4.  Linking the disbursement of the EU budget to the 
adoption and implementation of NASs and NAPs.
 
The European Commission is in the driver’s seat. As the 
work on the Green Deal and achieving a climate-neutral 
EU continues, it is paramount that the new EU Adaptation 
Strategy addresses the urgency of the situation, the role 
of risk-prevention and the need for adaptation efforts to 
contribute to the mitigation goals, and that it ambitiously 
steers member states to improve collaboration. If the  
von der Leyen Commission succeeds in setting up an 
agenda for action, inciting member states to collaborate 
and mobilise resources towards the building of a climate-
resilient Europe, multiple benefits can be expected. 
The message is clear: adaptation is not an option, but a 
socially, environmentally and economically sound must.
If the von der Leyen Commission succeeds 
in setting up an agenda for action,  
inciting member states to collaborate  
and mobilise resources towards the 
building of a climate-resilient Europe, 
multiple benefits can be expected.
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